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The ethics of the financial crisis and financial reform 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper analyses the financial crisis and financial reform from two alternative ethical 
perspectives as compared to the mainstream one in economics, utilitarianism. It contrasts 
deontology with the ethics of care and argues that the rule-based deontological approach is not 
able to prevent a next serious crisis. It argues instead that apart from a minimum of rules, the 
contextual, relationship-oriented ethics of care is necessary for a stable and client-oriented 
financial sector. It poses the hypothesis that such an ethics of care is already available in the 
sector, although marginally, and quite effective. This hypothesis is tested with exploratory 
survey data from the Netherlands as well as two case studies of caring financial innovation from 
the Netherlands.
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The ethics of the financial crisis and financial reform 
 
… with one hand, Citibank sold a package of toxic mortgage-backed 
securities to unsuspecting customers – securities that it knew were likely to go 
bust – and, with the other hand, shorted the same securities – that is, bet millions 
of dollars that they would go bust. It doesn’t get any immoral than this. 
Thomas L. Friedman ‘Did You Hear the One About the Bankers?’ 
 New York Times, October 20, 2011. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Academic interpretations of the financial crisis often refer to ‘thick concepts’, as Amartya Sen 
calls them, which have both descriptive and normative value.  We see references to “hiding risky 
situations”, “excessive liberalization”, “extremely high bonuses”, “irresponsible loans”, “failing 
control”,  “regulatory capture”, “perverse incentives” , “moral hazard”, “too rosy assessments”, 
and “excessive liquidity related to consumerism” (Schneider and Kirchgässner, 2009; Nothwehr 
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and Manning, 2009; Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson and Lee, 2008; Narayan, Ferri and Brem, 2008; 
Hart and Zingales, 2009; Daron Acemoglu, 2009; 2009). 
Neoclassical theory, with its efficient market hypothesis, normal probability distribution 
of risk, and principal-agent incentive logic, reflect a particular ethical theory. This is the theory 
of utilitarianism, but in a specific form, namely with a highly subjective interpretation of utility. 
This, I will argue, is part and parcel of the underlying causes of the crisis (see also Crespo and 
van Staveren, 2012). In the next section, I want to briefly discuss two other ethical theories, 
namely deontology and the ethics of care. The reason for doing so is that the ethics of the crisis 
and financial reform can also be understood in alternative ethical frameworks, which will help to 
understand what alternative behavioral paths, taken by some actors, are available for successful 
financial sector reform. The section thereafter will present the results of an exploratory survey 
among Dutch financial professionals. The survey results suggest that the ethical dimensions of 
the crisis and reform indeed follow distinct paths, in which distinct ethical approaches can be 
recognized. The last part of the paper will present two case studies in alternative finance, as a 
response to the crisis. These case studies show how an ethics of care may translate into a 
meaningful and economically sound alternative financial structure and behavior. The conclusion 
of the paper emphasizes that regulation may be important to prevent crises and to guide financial 
reform after a crisis, but that a caring ethical approach is just as important, precisely because it 
guides less crisis-prone behavior in finance, and informs financial innovation towards more 
stable and sustainable finance, supporting the real economy instead of endangering it. 
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Two alternative ethical theories and the financial sector 
 Deontology, also referred to as rule-ethics, is concerned with rules which reflect the 
good, or justice, rather than outcomes. A dominant form of such rules is expressed in the 
Categorical Imperative, stating that one should act according to that maxim whereby you can at 
the same time will that it should become a universal law (White, 2009). Or, a more individual-
oriented interpretation of its universalist implication: acting to others as you would like others to 
behave towards yourself (and expect them to do the same). Hence, deontology is not an 
individualist ethics, as is utilitarianism, but a social and universalist ethics, it is concerned with 
justice, with what is considered as right for a society as a whole (White, 2009).  
 In the financial sector, deontology is reflected in regulation: by Central Banks, 
governments, and the sector itself. Clearly, deontology failed as a moral guidance in the financial 
sector. Obviously, it is not merely the amount of regulation that matters, but the quality of 
regulation. From a deontological perspective, financial sector regulation should be thus that it is 
supported throughout the sector, and hence, regarded as just or fair. Regulation failed in 
particular in terms of two of the moral connotations listed in section two: excessive liberalization 
of the financial market and a failing control of banks, partly through regulatory capture. It is 
clear that the decreased regulation was inadequate to live up to the principles of deontological 
ethics. Rules that had come into being after the 1929 crisis had been removed through a strong 
bank lobby in the US (Igan, Mishra and Tressel, 2009), and new rules were not yet made for new 
financial strategies and products, such as short-selling, credit default swaps and derivatives, even 
though they were being traded increasingly. Without a stronger commitment to rules, both in 
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terms of rule setting and rule enforcement, in the financial sector, deontology has limited moral 
capacity to prevent a next crisis.  
Unlike deontology, which relies on external enforcement of moral behaviour, the ethics 
of care helps to understand agents’ behavior and firms’ strategies from a deeper ethical sense. It 
is concerned with ethical reflection and deliberation by agents every time where they did have 
the space to make different choices. The ethics of care is attentive to the inter-personal level, 
where ethics is concerned with sustaining human relationships and preventing harm to others 
(Waerness, 2009). In the words of ethicist of care, Virginia Held: “Whereas justice protects 
equality and freedom, care fosters social bonds and cooperation” (Held, 2006: 15). And it is here 
where the other moral terms that we have seen in section two will come into the picture, terms 
concerning hiding of risk, extremely high bonuses and other perverse incentives, construction of 
securities that no-one understands, too rosy credit ratings, and the consumerism implied in 
extremely low interest rate policies. These moral dimensions of the crisis have much less to do 
with regulation than with responsibility of the agents involved, vis-a-vis other agents and 
organizations. The ethics of care enables a fundamental shift in the parameters of the financial 
market. “With the ethics of care and an understanding of its intertwined values, such as those of 
sensitivity, empathy, responsiveness, and taking responsibility, we could perhaps more 
adequately judge where the boundaries of the market should be” (Held, 2006: 119). This also 
helps us to seek different roles for the government in relation to the financial market beyond that 
of protector of rights or rule maker and keeper, as Held rightly argues. 
 In the ethics of care, preventing harm to others is contextualized. It is not abstract, as the 
rule of non-intervention or a set of rules based on principles, but inherent in the relatedness of 
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actors.  Preventing harm to others therefore requires taking responsibility for the consequences of 
one’s actions, not only as an individual but also through institutions, and responsibility for 
preventing the system in which one functions to turn into an uncontrollable chaos causing harm 
to all involved. Care also involves sympathy, in the sense of being able to place oneself in the 
shoes of others, as Adam Smith already explained – not limited to particular others known to 
oneself, nor an abstract, generalized other similar to oneself as in the Categorical Imperative – 
but concrete others whose circumstances are imaginable due to the general information one has 
about their context (Benhabib, 1987). So, preventing harm to others requires contextualization, in 
order to be able to know how others are in their concrete situation and what our responsibilities 
to them would be. 
 The ethics of care, when applied to the economy is expressed through efforts to minimize 
harm in day-to-day practices which have possible harmful effects on others, whether these would 
come from free markets or government regulation or intra-firm self-interested behavior, power 
seeking strategies or any other behavior in an economic sector. Possible harmful effects of 
behavior abound because of imperfect markets, risk alongside uncertainty, and a wide variety of 
behavioral motives including harmful ones. In particular it is uncertainty which so much 
influences financial markets, which goes beyond risk, because the probabilities are unknown. 
Keynes, of course, already knew this, as Skidelsky (2009: 75) notes: “Keynes believed that in 
many situations market participants face irreducible uncertainty. They have no basis on which to 
calculate the risks they face in making an investment. They are plunging into the unknown.” And 
this condition places any economic sector at any time in transition, as Keynes already noted, 
rather than jumping from equilibrium to equilibrium, whether by free market forces or state 
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interference. And in transition, rules are often not applicable or have not been established yet. It 
is this fragility of economic life and human fallibility in economic decision making under 
conditions of uncertainty, which results in harm and to which government regulation is, although 
necessary, utterly insufficient (see also Hellwig, 2008, on systemic risk regulation). It is 
precisely such fragility and fallibility to which a caring attitude responds, by contextual 
reasoning. And such contextual reasoning is also what Keynes pictured as the most adequate 
response to financial crises. He stated, as recounted by Skidelsky (2009: 76) that the cures “are 
not meant to be definitive; they are subject to all sorts of special assumptions and are necessarily 
related to the particular conditions of the time.” 
  
Exploratory Survey among Dutch financial professionals 
The dataset contains survey information of 111 male and female financial professionals in the 
Netherlands, of which 74 (66.7%) women and 37 (33.3%) men
1
. The online survey was carried 
out in the period December 2010-January 2011, using NetQ. The data were analyzed using SPSS 
version 15. The sample size as well as the sex ratio are not representative for the financial sector 
in the Netherlands. The reason is that the sample was drawn through an online survey posted on 
LinkedIn, using the snowball method starting from a women financial professionals’ network. 
The results should therefore be interpreted as exploratory and not representative for the financial 
sector in the Netherlands or internationally. The value of the survey lies in the exploration of 
                                                 
1
 In a different paper, I analyse the survey results from a gender perspective. 
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attitudes and views of financial behaviour and governance during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Hence, its strength is largely qualitative, concerned with how financial professionals view 
financial behaviour in relation to the crisis, rather than representative of financial behaviour and 
attitudes.  
The key characteristics of the financial professionals included in the survey point out that 
they earn modest salaries, and bonuses in the range of their salaries, with some receiving up to 
half a million euro. They all received substantially less bonuses after the crisis. 
 
Bonuses & targets 
This section looks into the moral dimensions of actual financial behaviour. A first step is a look 
into the targets that the financial professionals need to achieve, and how these are related to the 
bonuses they receive. Almost all respondents need to meet targets (92.8%). For the majority, 
target levels have remained the same since the crisis, whereas for 34% targets have become 
higher since the crisis. Apparently, the crisis has not changed the target-focus in the human 
resource management practices in the financial sector, despite the critiques that have been raised 
about the perverse effects of such incentives in Dutch banks (Wawoe, 2010). When asked 
whether there is a clear relationship between target and bonus, 74.7% agrees that this is the case. 
But when the data on bonuses is analysed more closely, a more nuanced picture emerges. First, 
there is a strong correlation between the bonuses in 2007 and in 2009 (p<0.01). This suggests 
that bonuses may not be strongly correlated with meeting targets, as it is not very likely that most 
people have met their targets during the crisis. Second, the correlation between the 2009 bonus 
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and targets is statistically insignificant. Before the crisis, however, the relationship was 
statistically significant (p<0.05). This seems to suggest that the crisis has not contributed to a 
more effective bonus policy in the financial sector. Instead, there may be path dependency of 
bonuses, irrespective of targets. Have old rules become entitlements, widely supported because 
they benefit everyone? 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of respondents receiving a bonus 
 
 
When asked whether the current bonus system should be adjusted towards long run profitability 
and/or stability, 90.1% of the respondents answer positively. This suggests that the financial 
professionals are well aware of the limited effectiveness of the current bonus system for the 
stability and performance of the financial sector in the Netherlands. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
no bonus less than 10,000
euro
10,000 - 100,000
euro
100,000 - 500,000
euro
2007
2009
11 
 
 
Risk taking 
64.9% of the financial professionals state that they adjusted their risk levels downwards when 
financial markets are in a volatile stage. When risk levels are broken down into five categories, 
we see that across these categories, the levels of risk have shifted somewhat towards lower levels 
after the crisis, except for the small group of financial professionals taking very high risks: this 
category has increased, from 2.7% to 3.6%. The difference in risk levels before and after the 
crisis is statistically significant (p<0.01). Moreover, the change after the crisis has led to a higher 
spread in risk levels in the group surveyed, as figure 1 shows. When asked whether they think 
that financial markets are more influenced by risk (known probabilities) or by uncertainty 
(unknown probabilities), 61.3% state that uncertainty is the dominant factor. This helps to 
explain the high percentage of respondents taking what they regard as neutral risk levels: they 
may be aware that there exists no probability distribution for the possible states of the world in 
finance. This recognition implies that there is little space for uniform decision rules, as in widely 
used mathematical models. A contextual ethics of responsibility, such as the ethics of care, 
seems more relevant under conditions of strong uncertainty. 
The survey asked specifically about the importance of particular risk-management 
frameworks. The large majority relies on intuition (94.6%), whereas a small minority states that 
they follow others (17.1%). Other risk-management frameworks are also important, with formal 
rules, rules of thumb, fundamentals, and information sharing in networks all being regarded as 
important by around three quarters of the respondents. Computer models are deemed important 
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by 51.4%. The low share of respondents stating that they follow what others are doing indicates 
little direct support for Keynes’ thesis of herd behaviour. On the other hand, information sharing 
in networks may also result in herd behaviour, and so may rules set by one’s organisation and 
one’s own rules of thumb. Even intuition may lead to herd behaviour, in particular because most 
respondents combine the various risk management frameworks, so that external and internal 
information is combined. The high percentage of respondents answering that intuition is an 
important risk management framework is insightful for the analysis of the crisis. It suggests that 
what is generally referred to as risk is regarded as subjective rather than as calculable risk, and 
hence, not so much as risk but indeed, as became clear above, as uncertainty. Most financial 
professionals seem very much aware, following Keynes, that financial markets are largely 
characterized by uncertainty. 
When asked about the extent of the social environment taken into account, most 
respondents answered that they combined a technical analysis with a relational context analysis 
(63.1%), while a smaller group replied that they took the social context into account along with a 
technical analysis (27.0%). Only 9.9% stated that they rely purely on a technical analysis. 
Combining these results with the outcomes for risk management, it seems that at least part of the 
intuitive risk management framework comes from the recognition that social and relational 
factors matter for financial decision making. This points at an ethics of care approach, in which 
relationships are the moral drivers of decision making. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of respondents taking different levels of risk 
 
 
 
Whistle blowing 
Another moral dimension in the financial sector concerns attitudes toward whistle blowing. 
59.5% stated that they have ever blown the whistle, most of them about a policy or a target. But 
in only 45.5% of these cases, appropriate action was taken. In most cases, the signal was ignored 
or the whistleblower was told not to pursue the matter further. In 28.8% of the cases, respondents 
felt that their career was negatively affected by their action. These data indicate that when 
financial professionals raise their voice against a bank strategy or behavior by management, there 
is often no adequate response by the firm they work for. It seems that financial firms in the 
Netherlands generally lack an ethical framework to formulate an adequate response and to 
adequately protect whistleblowers. Such a framework may either be rule-based, with clearly 
codified steps to be taken, or framed in an ethics of care approach, with a more open and 
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personal approach. It will be the organizational culture that determines which of these two 
approaches are likely to fit best in a particular bank. Since 2009, top bankers are held to a code 
of ethics – referred to as the banker’s oath – which will be made obligatory for all bankers by the 
government in 2012
2
. But an oath will only have the power of contributing to cultural change 
when it is not regarded as a formality but as informing individual bankers’ decisions when moral 
dilemmas arise in day to day practices. 
 
Products 
The respondents were also asked whether they have copied financial products from competitors 
before the crisis that they would not do anymore after the crisis. 22.5% agreed that this was the 
case. 50.4% of the respondents said that before the crisis they have advised clients not to buy a 
particular product. After the crisis, this percentage has increased to 54.0%, a statistically 
significant difference. Even 88.3% agrees that financial services providers should be more client-
oriented, and care more about the personal circumstances of clients when offering them financial 
services. These results suggest that the crisis may have prompted self-reflection on what products 
are appropriate for which clients. It may signal an increased awareness of one’s personal 
                                                 
2
 For the Dutch bankers oath see: 
http://www.charteredbanker.com/MainWebSite/Resources/Document/magazinefeb10-dutch2.pdf 
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responsibility as financial professional to serve clients interests not so much in terms of offering 
them what they want, but advising them those products that best fit their personal situation. This 
clearly indicates a shift away from rule-based supply by financial professionals, of whatever the 
firm has on offer, towards a caring supply attitude in which the client’s personal context and 
perceived needs determine which products a financial service provider selects to offer to a client. 
 
Regulation versus responsibility 
The respondents were also asked about their views on regulation of the financial sector. A 
majority (55.9%) thinks that the Dutch Central Bank should not have stricter regulation than it 
has undertaken so far since the crisis. Half of the respondents (49.5%) thinks that the European 
Central Bank should not implement stricter regulation. They were also skeptical about the 
effectiveness of Basel III regulation. 64.9% believes that this will not help to prevent a next 
crisis. 57.7% opposes a bank tax. When asked about their preferences for government regulation 
or self-regulation, the majority of the respondents (64.0%) prefer self-regulation. The aversion 
against regulation is even stronger when they were asked about their moral attitude about their 
own operations: 19.8% favoured rules, whereas 80.2% was in favour of responsibility as the 
driving moral incentive for their decision making as financial professionals.  
Apparently, most respondents believe that they can and should follow their inner moral 
compass, rather than making the financial sector subject to more regulation. This raises the 
question about the direction and strength of their moral compass, and suggests that this should 
become a prominent part of the training of financial professionals. Paradoxically, a majority of 
16 
 
67.5% thinks that the 2009 law of Zorgplicht (Caring Obligation), requiring financial service 
providers to better inform clients about risks of financial products, has a positive effect on client 
satisfaction. Apparently, the respondents think that external enforcement of responsible 
behaviour is helpful for client satisfaction. Perhaps they think that this would force others than 
themselves to behave appropriately. This interpretation seems to get support from the cross 
tabulation of Zorgplicht with a preference for responsibility in their own operations. The 
relationship between these two questions is not statistically significant, implying that their 
support for the Caring Obligation law is not related to their preferences for responsibility in their 
own behaviour. It may be, therefore, that they do not trust other financial services providers to 
behave as responsible as they think they behave themselves. Again, this points out that more 
attention is needed to ethical dimensions of financial professionals’ behaviour, in their training, 
performance reviews, and perhaps also bonus policy. 
A majority of 87.4% recognizes that short-term shareholder value orientation has 
contributed to the financial crisis. This suggests that most respondents think that such a crisis is 
inherent in the capitalist system. When asked about alternatives, one third (36.0%) answered that 
they would like to see a reduction in the power of shareholders and more balance with the 
interests of other stakeholders. Almost no respondent favours nationalisation of key banks 
(1.8%) while only a small group is in favour of having only cooperative banks (14.4%). Another 
group favours soft controls based on more social control in the sector – again, a reliance on 
responsibility and self-regulation. So, although the driving force of the capitalist system – 
shareholder value orientation – is criticised, nationalization, regulation, and cooperative 
organizations are not favoured as alternatives. Apparently, most financial professionals believe 
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that a more responsible attitude and a change in business law to balance shareholder interests 
with those of other stakeholders will be able to prevent another serious crisis.  
 
Figure 3. Percentage of respondents assessing Dutch banks too big to fail 
 
 
 
Concerning the top three Dutch banks (ABN Amro bank, ING, and Rabobank), which all have a 
balance total larger than Dutch GDP, a small majority (52.3%) agrees that these banks have 
become too big to fail. Interestingly, when asked about a solution, more than half of the 
respondents (61%) had no answer. 41.0% agreed to split up banks into savings and investment 
banks, following the policy discussion in the US and UK (Volcker rule and Vickers). 
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Interestingly, when asked why one of these top-three banks, a cooperative bank, has performed 
so well despite the crisis, only 10.8% has answered that this had nothing to do with its 
cooperative structure. 89.2% thinks that the fact that Rabobank is a cooperative bank helps to 
explain why it continued to perform well during the crisis. So, there seems to be some wishful 
thinking. On the one hand, a large majority of respondents agrees that short-term shareholder 
orientation has contributed to the crisis, whereas on the other hand, there is little support for 
regulation, cooperative banking, and nationalization of key banks. The sector seems to have an 
unfailing believe in the self-regulation and responsibility of its own actors and institutions. At the 
same time, a majority of 74.8% thinks that more female leadership in the financial sector would 
help to prevent a crisis like the current one. This may signal that the respondents have more 
confidence in women’s moral compass than in men’s. In the literature on ethics and gender, there 
is some support for this: men are found to have a stronger tendency to rule-oriented moral 
reasoning whereas women have a stronger tendency toward responsibility-oriented reasoning, as 
has been theorized in the ethics of care (Gilligan, 1982; Held, 2006; Tronto, 1993).  
Finally, the survey asked about the personal responsibility of respondents and their 
superiors. 63% of the respondents said that their superiors should have acted more responsibly. A 
much lower share of respondents agrees that oneself should have responded more responsibly, 
namely 28%. These results indicate that reliance on the moral compass of financial professionals, 
male or female, may not be the most effective way to prevent future crisis of the extent we have 
now. The professionals tend to blame the system and superiors more often than accepting moral 
failures in their own of behavior.  
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Figure 4. Percentage of respondents assessing responsibility 
 
 
 
Moral perversion in finance? 
The survey results indicate that most financial professionals don’t believe that regulation can 
prevent crises and seem to accept the fate of regular financial crises. This attitude obviously 
undermines a deontological ethics as moral guidance for the sector. Instead, the majority of 
respondents recognize this and favour self-regulation and personal responsibility. At the same 
time, they don’t believe in measures such as nationalization of key banks, setting up cooperative 
banks, or appointing more women at the top. They do support a shift of incentives towards the 
long run, but don’t seem to see how this should be implemented, with their aversion of regulation 
… This leaves us with a paradox: the common opinion in the sector is against regulation, while 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
your superiors  you self
yes
no
20 
 
there is only limited personal responsibility, putting the blame on colleagues, superiors, and the 
system, while discouraging whistle blowing …  
It seems that a better moral foundation for the sector would need to come either from 
strong external regulation and strict external enforcement, or, alternatively, much better training 
of financial professionals in professional ethics, in particular in personal responsibility towards 
clients and firms, and in shaping formal and informal institutions guiding and incentives 
responsible behavior. 
The next two sections will present two examples of such institutional innovations towards 
responsible financing. They express forms of caring financing, the first one at the macro level, 
which contributes to higher capital ratios in the financial sector, contributing to a more stable 
financial sector, and the second one at the micro level, which contributes to a closer link between 
the financial sector and the real economy and a transition towards a more sustainable economy. 
 
Case study on ‘caring capital financing’3 
This section presents a case study of a new capital funding product that a major Dutch bank has 
developed in response to the crisis and which has attracted much attention from investors and 
regulators worldwide. It is an example of a caring financial innovation and was developed by 
two senior bankers, in the context of regulatory pressure, limited liquidity in a hesitant capital 
                                                 
3
 This case study is based on information released through the media, a presentation for investors, and an interview I 
held with the two key persons who developed the security at Rabobank’s capital funding department, Treasury 
Rabobank Group, Utrecht, 18
th
 of May, 2010. 
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market, in a cooperative bank structure with client-value orientation. The case study points out 
that a caring attitude partly depends on an enabling institutional context.  
Rabobank, a top three Dutch bank and market leader in savings, mortgages, and 
agricultural lending in the Netherlands, has issued an innovative form of senior debt, called the 
Senior Contingent Note (SCN) as a response to the crisis
4
. The SCN is in first instance a way to 
raise capital for the bank through bonds. The value of the bond does not appear on the balance 
sheet unless the bank’s equity capital ratio would to fall below 7%. In that very unlikely case the 
bank’s core capital will be strengthened as the bank will receive 75% of the value of the 
outstanding SCNs. Hence, those who bought the bond will lose 75% of their investment
5
. In 
exchange for that risk, the interest rate that bond holders receive includes a risk premium. 
Rabobank is the only large Dutch bank that did not need state support, that kept a healthy 
equity capital ratio and its triple A rating throughout the crisis, merely dealing with collateral 
damage spilling over from other banks that were hit seriously by the crisis
6
. Rabobank is a 
cooperative bank, so it cannot raise capital through issuing shares, it is not listed on the stock 
market
7. Although about 85% of Rabobank’s activities are in the Netherlands, about half of its 
                                                 
4
 The transaction date was 12
th
 of March 2010, at the amount 1.25 billion euro for a 10 year fixed rate senior 
contingent note priced at an annual coupon of 6.875%. It was twice oversubscribed and sold to major investors 
across the world. 
5
 In the past, convertible bonds were labeled as Tier 2 capital and institutional lenders were often supported in a bail-
out (Levinson, 2010). With new SCNs in the new situation after the crisis, it is less likely that regulators will protect 
these types of capital.  
6
 The cost of its bad loans in 2009 was nearly 2 billion euro, which was 0.33% of its balance total of 608 billion 
euro. On 31 December 2009 its equity capital ratio was 12.5%. Rabobank has always been profitable since its start 
more than a century ago, including in the crisis years 2008 and 2009. 
7
 The bank has 1.8 million members, which is a non-financial membership for any client but involves no claim on 
the equity of the 147 local banks. It is globally number one in several countries in the food- and agri-business and 
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capital is raised abroad. The major way in which the bank raises its capital is simply through 
retained profit, while issuing certificates to its members (Rabobank clients can become member 
of the member council of their local branch) is another recent innovation of the bank to raise 
capital and at the same time to involve members more closely as capital providers to the bank. 
But that is small scale and through the local, independent branches. The SCN targets large 
investors such as pension funds and globally operating investment funds. 
The SCN was not developed at the international branch of the bank, where the financial 
traders are based, the fast world of short term transactions and the balancing act between long 
term obligations and short term liquidity. Instead, the new type of bond was developed at the 
treasury of the bank, as part of the long term funding strategy. The challenge during the crisis 
was how to get access to liquidity in a drying up market (which in Europe was extra hit by 
defaulting governments, such as that of Greece) on the one hand and staying true to the bank’s 
conservative capital position (for which it had been criticized before the crisis as being not 
profitable enough) which had earned the bank its triple A rating throughout the crisis. In a 
market in crisis risk and uncertainty are the major factors that investors are worried about, 
following their sentiments. Moreover, during a crisis risks turn into uncertainties, as rating 
agencies cannot assign any probabilities anymore to the chances of default for institutions or 
even for individual products
8
. The strength of Rabobank is precisely its prudence – its higher 
than average equity capital ratio, as compared with most other banks, which gave it a boring 
                                                                                                                                                             
has 623 foreign offices in 48 countries. The maximum bonus for senior management and executives is 30% of the 
salary and half of the bonus is transferred only after three years. 
8
 The top three international rating agencies, including Standard and Poor’s, which together have more than 90% of 
the market, did not want to assign a rating to the SCN, since they preferred to await new international regulation 
coming from Basel. 
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image in the booming years before the crisis. This asset – prudence – was the basis for 
developing the SCN. The product was developed internally with consultation of a few large 
investors. Whereas Rabobank initially planned a 100% core capital strengthening with the new 
product, investors made clear that that would be unacceptable by the market. A different case of 
Lloyd’s in London half a year earlier9, but with similarities, as well as past cases of defaulting 
banks across the globe have led to the current 75% ratio of the SCN to be added to the balance 
sheet in case the bank’s equity capital ratio would fall below 7%. The investors run a risk and 
contrary to shareholders, they do not benefit from more risky projects undertaken by the bank 
that may bring in more short term profits, instead, they will demand that the bank either increases 
its buffers or raises the premium on newly issued contingent notes. The interest rate was not 
discussed at these sounding board meetings with investors, until the last week before the 
transaction on March 12
th
 2010 in a meeting with 4 major investors. The interest among 
institutional investors as well as private investment funds was overwhelming, both nationally and 
internationally (London, Paris, Frankfurt, New York) so that the transaction of the 10 year fixed 
rate Senior Contingent Note, priced at an annual coupon of 6.875% was twice oversubscribed, 
and generated 1.25 billion euro. 
So, prudence – by putting the responsibility for risk where it should be, namely the 
providers of capital – made it possible to find a market for this product. But it was also the 
pressure coming from regulators that led to its development – without the crisis and its 
subsequent call for (re-) regulation of banks and financial markets it would not have been 
                                                 
9
 Lloyd’s is a listed bank, which failed to raise sufficient capital through issuing new shares. Hence, it issued 
contingent notes that would be turned into equity in case of pre-defined stress. 
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developed, at least, not now and not in this form. Regulators in the Netherlands and Europe are 
discussing a bank tax, equal for all banks, to form a fund that in case of need would become a 
lender of last resort. However, such a fund does not solve the problem of moral hazard and does 
not reward conservative banks for their conservative positions and subsequent higher capital 
ratios. Therefore, a second reason for developing the product was to influence regulation, as both 
Basel III agreements and European Union law making were and are still in the making. In other 
words, rather than lobbying against a bank tax, the SCN represents a different type of incentive 
for banks and by banks, to increase their core capital in case of crisis, but with the great 
advantage that it reduces moral hazard by providing an incentive for the issuing bank to keep its 
equity capital ratio up by keeping risks manageable. Whereas in case of a too low capital ratio, 
the 75% shift of the loan to the balance sheet would imply that the equity capital ratio would be 
increased automatically, based on the rule implied in the SCN, so that the bank does not 
(immediately) require financial support by the state, and hence is not a burden on tax payer. This 
characteristic of contingent capital allows banks to increase their capital ratio in a more effective 
way than through issuing new shares because the prices of shares are currently very low and 
demand is reluctant. Moreover, a contingent capital product like SCN would help to reduce the 
likeliness of another crisis, at least, a crisis caused by too high risk-taking by banks as is the case 
with the current crisis because it forces banks to keep risks relatively low in order to prevent the 
equity capital ratio to go down too much: that would lower demand for this type of bond and 
hence limit the possibility of banks to acquire equity. The SCN can also be seen as a strategic 
move to influence regulation, which indeed did raise attention from regulators all over the world. 
Obviously, a single Dutch bank is not going to fight a bank tax, but it does show that there are 
more ways of capitalizing banks in terms of crisis, and in a more effective way than through a 
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bank tax. This feature of the development of SCN hence can be characterized as one of a long 
run view, as a concern with financial market volatility and effective responses to this from the 
banking sector itself – an attitude of responsibility. Not the kind of self-sacrificing responsibility 
as in stopping a fight at risk of your life, but the kind of responsibility as part of a liberal attitude, 
accepting the consequences of one’s individual actions for the whole, participants (like clients 
and investors) and non-participants who bear negative externalities (like the tax payer). It is the 
responsibility that Adam Smith wrote about, that does not constrain markets but rather supports 
the effective functioning of markets. SCN expresses such responsibility because it is a self-
regulating instrument against too high risk positions by banks and prevents costly bail-outs and 
compensation of clients’ deposits in times of crisis. It is, in the end, a mechanism that puts the 
risk where it should be, namely by the capital providers of banks, rather than its clients or the 
taxpayer. 
Finally, why was it a cooperative bank to develop this innovation? Why not equally big 
banks listed on the stock exchange, such as ABN Amro or ING? This has only indirectly to do 
with the cooperative structure of the bank. The idea did not come from the member council, not 
the local ones, neither from the central membership council. So, as much as the bank is driven by 
client-value through close contact with its members and other clients, this did not play a role in 
the SCN. But it was the lack of access to capital through shares that drove the bank’s treasury to 
be innovative and to develop a product that would on the one hand build on its conservative 
position and on the other hand even strengthen its image in the market as a prudent bank, by 
providing an extra buffer for its capital ratio. In other words, the other banks did not develop 
such a contingent note simply because they are too busy to survive under the pressure of 
26 
 
shareholders and demands by the state in exchange for financial support. In the words of one of 
the interviewees: “we do not have the shareholders pressure, which is an enormous benefit” and 
thereby it also “protects against moral hazard internally” and “pushes to be creative to raise 
capital if you can’t do it through equity”.  This confirms Keynes’ insight that it is the capitalist 
system based on equity capital which generates the uncertainty and subsequent systemic risk in 
financial markets, as Skidelsky (2009: 84) reminds us: “Under capitalism, uncertainty is 
generated by the system itself, because it is an engine for accumulating capital goods whose 
rewards came not now but later. The engine of wealth creation is at the same time the source of 
economic and social instability.” 
In conclusion, the contingent capital product of Rabobank may be characterized as a 
caring form of capital financing because it is a form of self-regulation lowering risk of default, 
while reinforcing the bank’s good rating. This, in turn, lowers the costs of capital funding, which 
makes it not only a solid product for the bank but also for the financial market, without the moral 
hazard of shifting risk to clients and tax payers. SCN therefore carries a positive externality as 
compared to share-based capital funding which has a negative externality – it reduces systemic 
uncertainty in the financial sector. 
 
Case study of caring consumer-producer financing
10
 
                                                 
10
 The interview was held in October 2011, on the farm. 
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This is a case study of careful financing at a micro level. It concerns consumers financing energy 
generation for a producer, with a return on investment paid in consumer goods. Both parties 
benefit and experience higher advantages as compared to traditional, bank-based financing. 
Koos and Monique van der Laan have an ecological milk farm in a small village the west of the 
Netherlands near Gouda, with 60 cows. They sell the milk, through an association of over 100 
ecological milk farmers in the Netherlands, to regular as well as organic supermarkets. Their 
other products, which are also organic – including meat, apple juice, and walnut icecream – are 
sold at the farm and to shops and restaurants in the neighbourhood, stimulating the local 
economy.  
They had decided to invest in solar energy for the farm on the roof of the cow shed, during the 
financial crisis in 2008. They already had taken bank credit and went for an alternative credit 
opportunity, ‘Boer zoekt Buur’11. This was initiated by Triple I-S, green energy supplier 
Greenchoice, and VSBfonds. 27 organic farms and 750 investors/consumers (‘neighbours’) 
participated. The project offered shares worth 250 euro each. In return, investors/consumers 
received six vouchers of 50 euro each, to be spent on the products on the farm of their choice, 
one per year. This is a return on investment (ignoring inflation) of 20 percent. There are 
additional advantages for both farmers and consumers. For the farmers: the investment does not 
require pay back in money, from profits, and hence saves money for other financial investments. 
                                                 
11
 Dutch for “Farmer looks for Neighbour’, and a variation in the name of a popular Dutch tv dating show, 
sold to tv stations across the world, ‘Boer zoekt Vrouw’ (Farmer looks for Wife’). 
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Instead, the arrangement to pay back in products ensures the farmers a fixed minimum demand 
and an increase in volume sold. 
30 consumers participated in the solar energy investment on the farm by Koos and 
Monique van der Laan. This resulted in 50% financing of the investment through the project, 
with the other 50% financed through the famers’ savings and a small loan. The disadvantage of 
the project is that the farmers have a higher administrative load as compared to a bank loan, 
because of the smaller number of investors. The advantage of this individualized investment 
relationship is more contact between farmer and ‘neighbor’, one of the objectives of the project 
and a means to support sustainable farming through strengthening consumer ties with organic 
agriculture. This is also enabled through additional caring economic activities such as voluntary 
work at the farm and the adoption of cows in exchange for regularly updated individualized 
information about the cow’s wellbeing. The additional advantages for the consumer are first that 
consumers know where their food originates, by visiting the farm in person. Second, they benefit 
from the price difference in organic products sold in organic or regular shops on the one hand 
and sold at wholesale prices at the farm. The vouchers they receive are in wholesale value. To 
give an indication of the price advantage, the table below shows the price differences of several 
types of meat and other products at the farm and in shops in the Netherlands. The average 
weighted price advantage is 30 percent. 
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Table1. Organic product prices, 2012, per kilogram. 
Product Shop prices of similar 
organic products 
Organic farm 
prices 
Price difference 
per kilogram (%) 
Meat loaf 11,00 9,50 - 14% 
Entrecote 21,90 23,00 + 5% 
Rib-eye 23,50 19,00 - 19% 
Steak 28,50 23,00 - 19% 
Tournedos 53,50 35,00 - 35% 
Sausage 25,20 13,50 - 46% 
Apple juice (1 l.) 1,45 2,00 + 38% 
Walnuts 9,98 6,00 - 35% 
Cheese (young) 11,30 13,00 + 12% 
Average weighted 
price difference 
  - 30% 
Data sources: website De Beekhoeve; website of butcher chain De Groene Weg, Rotterdam; website of 
regular supermarket Albert Heijn and of organic supermarket Eko Plaza. 
 
In conclusion, the ‘Boer zoekt Buur’ project is one of careful financing, because it reduces pay 
back risk by providing consumers with vouchers for six years rather than requiring pay back out 
of volatile financial returns, while in the case of bankruptcy, they may collectively offer 
voluntary labour for the survival (farm work) and future strategy (management advise) of the 
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farm. The project provides access to alternative investment funds to the farmer, which is highly 
needed in times of fiancial crisis with credit crunches by banks; it provides a minimum in 
product sales for the farmer, and next to a return on investment of 20%, a price advantage of 
30% for the ‘neighbours’ for trustworthy ecological food products. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has provided some empirical support, from the financial sector in the Netherlands, 
for the use of an ethics of care approach in financial sector reform. Although the survey is 
exploratory and the two case studies are not representative of financial innovation after the crisis, 
they do provide an insight in an alternative ethical approach for the financial sector to simply 
more rules. They point out that given the characteristics of finance today – high uncertainty, high 
complexity, and a general rule-aversion among financial professionals – an ethics of care may be 
more meaningful and effective as a guidance in financial sector reform than a deontological 
ethics, based on rules. 
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